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In recent years, agriculture has attracted worldwide attention in the political 
arena, such as the summit meetings and the OECD’s council meetings at the 
ministerial level. Also, agriculture is one of the most important areas of  the 
current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The main focus of agricultural 
issues is the high level of  agricultural protection in such industrial countries 
as EC member  states and Japan. Even  the  United  States, which insists on 
drastic reductions in agricultural support, does not do its duty and liberalize 
trade  in  several  agricultural  commodities,  in  violation  of  the  ideal  of  the 
GATT. 
It is commonly observed that the agricultural sector is strongly protected in 
those developed economies in the advanced stage of  economic development, 
where  the  urban  population  shows less  resistance  to high  food  prices  and 
farmers are  more  powerful  in  lobbying  for  protection.  As  several  studies 
show, it is true that Japan’s level of agricultural protection has been one of  the 
highest  in the world in recent years (e.g., OECD  1987; Webb,  Lopez, and 
Penn 1990). While among the developed countries Japan is not unique in pro- 
tecting  agriculture,  it is, however, unique in the relations  existing there be- 
tween  agricultural  protection  and  agricultural  trade  and  production.  Even 
though its domestic agriculture is highly protected, Japan has increased agri- 
cultural imports sharply and become increasingly less food self-sufficient (as 
shown in table 4.1)-in  contrast with the EC countries, which maintain high 
levels of food self-sufficiency under the protection  of  the Common Agricul- 
tural Policy. Japan is now one of the largest food importers and the country 
most open to agricultural trade if measured in terms of food self-sufficiency. 
Masayoshi Honma is professor of  economics at Otaru University of  Commerce,  Hokkaido, 
Japan. 
The author acknowledges with gratitude the permission of  Yujiro Hayami for the use in this 
paper of the materials that are part of the results of a series of  research studies of Japan’s agricul- 
tural policies conducted jointly with him. 
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Table 4.1  Food Self-Sufficiency  Rates in Japan, 1960-89 (%) 







































































Source;  Japanese Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry, and Fisheries,  Shokuryo Jukyu Hyo  (Food 
balance sheets). 
Another feature of Japan’s agricultural protection that is different from other 
developed countries is its rapid growth in the protection level. In other words, 
the strong protection accorded agriculture in Japan is a relatively recent phe- 
nomenon. As we will see in section 4.2, Japan’s level of agricultural protec- 
tion in 1955 was much lower than that of European countries. However, that 
level rose rapidly and became the highest among industrial countries by 1970. 
These characteristics of Japan’s agricultural policy are strongly related  to 
the fast decline in comparative advantage in agriculture in the course of the 
high  industrial  productivity  growth  that  followed  the recovery  from World 
War 11. The decline in comparative advantage in agriculture was coupled with 
rapid increases in the demand for highly valued foodstuffs such as meat and 
milk  as  per capita income rose. To  increase  domestic  production  of  those 
products,  imports of feed grains and soybeans were liberalized in the 1950s 
and the early 1960s, respectively,  and thereafter Japan’s agricultural imports 
sharply increased. 
At the same time, the decline in comparative advantage in agriculture cre- 
ated a demand for agricultural  protection. The rapid change in comparative 
advantage created a serious intersectoral  adjustment problem requiring real- 
location of agricultural resources to industry. In order to decrease the cost of 
intersectoral  adjustment that rural  people had to shoulder in such forms as 
rural depopulation and rural-urban income disparity, farmers lobbied for pro- 
tection in order to shift a part of the intersectoral adjustment cost to the general 
public. 
Agricultural protectionism in a rapidly growing economy appears to have a 
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protection is determined. Japan’s protection policy  for agriculture has been 
persistent  and is not likely to cease because it has been domestically at an 
equilibrium in the political market. However, there is another player emerging 
on the political scene-the  foreign pressure demanding agricultural trade lib- 
eralization  in  Japan  in  exchange for  the  flood  of  exports  of  manufactured 
goods from Japan. Japan is now facing a sharp conflict between the internal 
resistance to and the external pressure for agricultural trade liberalization. 
This paper examines the development of Japan’s agricultural policy and the 
process of growth of agricultural protection, focusing on the political market. 
In the following sections, I first review briefly the background of current food 
and agricultural policies in Japan. Then I examine the level of Japan’s agricul- 
tural protection  in  an international  comparison.  The growth in agricultural 
protection is next related to political and economic factors to determine the 
level of protection, and the relation is tested by a regression analysis. Finally, 
some implications of Japan’s growth of agricultural protection are drawn. 
4.1  Review of Agricultural Policies in Japan 
4.1.1  Two Institutional Bases 
Current Japanese agricultural policies are implemented mainly through two 
institutions: the Food Control Law of 1942 and the Agricultural Basic Law of 
1961. The Food Control Law was originally designed to control food distri- 
bution  during the war, when  food was in very  short supply. After the  war, 
agricultural and nonagricultural economies were reconstructed,  and the food 
supply recovered. The Food Control Law has been adjusted to account for the 
increasing food supply, and few food items remain under direct government 
control-with  the notable exception of rice. 
Only agents designated by the Food Agency within the Ministry of  Agri- 
culture, Forestry, and Fisheries may participate in the marketing of rice, and 
prices are regulated from the farm gate to the wholesale level. In administra- 
tive practice, however, those regulations have gradually been relaxed, For ex- 
ample, producers now sell high-quality rice, which is an important factor in 
rice consumption, directly to wholesalers through cooperatives at a negotiated 
price, although the quantities of rice that producers can sell through this chan- 
nel and through the government agency at a fixed price are limited by quotas. 
Officially, producers cannot sell rice through any other channels, but it is said 
that about two million tons, or nearly one-fifth of total output, are marketed 
illegally, through private channels. In addition, two auction markets were es- 
tablished by the government in 1990, and about 1 million tons of rice are sold 
at regular auctions at more flexible prices, reflecting demand and supply by 
variety of rice. 
The Food Control  Law, originally instituted  to protect consumers during 
the war, works currently to support agricultural producers. The high support 98  Masayoshi Honma 
price stimulated an expansion of domestic production in excess of consump- 
tion,  resulting  in  an  accumulation  of  surplus  rice  in  government  storage, 
which made the adoption of an acreage-control  program in  1969 inevitable. 
The acreage-control program was strengthened under the continuous pressure 
of the ever-accumulating surplus stock and escalating government deficit. The 
acreage diverted from production  is currently  830,000 hectares,  almost one- 
third of  the paddy fields in Japan. 
In the course of economic development that followed Japan’s postwar re- 
covery, farmers’ incomes tended to lag behind those of urban workers. In an 
attempt to prevent the rural-urban income gap from widening, the Agricultural 
Basic Law, a national charter for agriculture, was enacted in  1961. The law 
declared that it was the government’s responsibility to raise agricultural pro- 
ductivity and thereby close the gap in income and welfare between farm and 
nonfarm people. Among the measures identified as necessary for this purpose 
were incentives to expand the production  of the high-income-elasticity  agri- 
cultural commodities and to enlarge the scale of the production unit. In order 
to improve farming efficiency, it was considered essential to increase the scale 
of farm operations by reducing the number of  inefficient farm units and pro- 
moting cooperative operations among the remaining farms. 
Despite such attempts at structural adjustment, the rate of agricultural pro- 
ductivity growth was not raised sufficiently, and the rural-urban  income gap 
continued to widen. The reaction of farmers was to organize political lobby- 
ing for protection by means of government intervention in agricultural product 
and input markets. When the increasing demand of farmers for protection was 
coupled with the decreasing resistance of  the nonfarm population as a result 
of the increasing per capita income and the decreasing Engel coefficient,  the 
result was a level of agricultural protection that remains among the highest in 
the world. 
4.1.2  Means of  Agricultural Protection 
Japanese agriculture is protected by such policy instruments as border pro- 
tection, direct supports on farm product prices, and subsidies on agricultural 
production inputs. A major source of  criticism of Japanese trade practices has 
been quantitative  restrictions  on imports of  agricultural  commodities. Until 
1988, twenty-two agricultural and marine products were subject to an import 
quota (IQ).  However, the quotas on ten types of  agricultural products  were 
removed after a GATT multinational panel declared them illegal in 1988. Fur- 
ther, the quotas on beef and oranges, which used to be held up as symbols of 
the closed nature of Japan’s market, were removed in April 1991 as a result of 
bilateral negotiations with the United States. 
Besides the IQ restrictions,  the imports of six agricultural commodities are 
controlled  by trade monopolies of governmental or semigovernmental  agen- 
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by the Livestock  Industry Promotion Corporation;  and silk by  the Silk and 
Sugar Price Stabilization Corporation. 
While quantitative  restrictions  are  strong in  Japan,  border protection  by 
means of tariffs and levies seems to be relatively modest (Johnson, Hemmi, 
and Lardinois 1985). In Japan, the variable levy of the EC type is not com- 
monly used, but a somewhat similar system is used for pork, in the form of a 
differential  tariff,  and for sugar and  silk, in the form of  an adjustable  sur- 
charge. 
In addition to such indirect supports as border protection,  various agricul- 
tural products are subject to direct government price support. The largest price 
support program is applied to rice under the Food Control Law. The price of 
rice that the government purchases from farmers is determined at a fixed level 
each year on the bases of  production  costs, nonfarm  wages, general  price 
level, and other economic conditions. This government rice price influences 
the price of rice distributed through other channels. Currently, the price of rice 
in Japan is not only far above the world price but also above the market equi- 
librium price under autarky  (Otsuka and Hayami 1985). Wheat  and barley 
produced  domestically  are purchased  by  the  Food  Agency,  if  their  market 
prices decline below floor prices. 
The so-called  price stabilization  programs  for meat, dairy  products,  and 
silk involve buffer stock operations to support domestic wholesale prices be- 
tween certain ceiling and floor prices. The deficits from the programs are fi- 
nanced  partly  by levies on imports and partly  by transfer from the general 
budget. The same applies to the government purchase at floor prices of sugar 
cane, sugar beets, and potatoes for starch making. 
Deficiency payments from the government  apply to a limited number of 
products such as soybeans, canola, and milk for processing. A variation of the 
deficiency payment scheme used in Japan is the Price Stabilization Fund, to 
which the government and producers pay contributions and from which pro- 
ducers receive  deficiency  payments  if  market  prices  decline  below  target 
prices. This scheme is applied to calves, fruit for processing, and some vege- 
tables. 
Production subsidy is also a major policy instrument for agricultural protec- 
tion. Japanese agricultural  policy  depends heavily  on subsidies,  which  are 
spread across a large number of items, each receiving a relatively small dis- 
bursement. In Japan, subsidies have substantially contributed to agricultural 
capital formation, especially to investment in land infrastructure.  It may ap- 
pear  that  subsidies  allocated  to  land  infrastructure  for  such  public-good 
projects  as imgation and drainage facilities  are not  protectionist  in nature. 
However, only about 20 percent of land infrastructure investment is allocated 
to major canals and water-control facilities, the rest going to farm ditches and 
farm consolidation  and reshaping, for which individual beneficiaries can be 
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4.2  Growth in Agricultural Protection 
4.2.1  Japan’s Level of Agricultural Protection 
Japan’s agricultural policy is now aimed mainly at protecting domestic ag- 
riculture.  However, such a high level of agricultural protection is a relatively 
recent  phenomenon.  This can  be  clearly  demonstrated  by  an international 
comparison over time. The measure used for comparison is the average nom- 
inal rate of protection  (NRP), calculated by subtracting the value of  agricul- 
tural output in border prices from the value of agricultural output in domestic 
prices and dividing the remainder by the value of agricultural output in border 
prices; this is equivalent to the weighted average of  the NRPs of individual 
commodities  using their shares in the total  output value at border prices as 
weights. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the average NRPs estimated for fourteen industrial 
and newly industrializing countries  by comparing producer and border (im- 
Table 4.2  Comparison of the Nominal Rates of Agricultural Protection between East 
Asian Countries and Eleven Other Developed Countries, 1955-87  (%)’ 
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69  74  76  85  108  151 
-4  29  30  117  147  160 
-1  2  20  52  28  74 
5  17  19  25  34  69 
30  47  29  30  37  81 
55  50  39  44  40  79 
66  69  38  57  72  127 
35  41  32  21  38  57 
20  27  6  35  39  79 
45  52  29  38  43  84 
50  65  43  59  65  131 
73  96  96  126  181  218 
5  7  -5  -2  -1  5 
2  -5  -4  2  0  19 
9  11  4  0  11  23 
Sources:  Data for 1955-80  are from Anderson and Hayami (1986, 26). Data for  1985 and  1987 are 
estimates by the author. 
aDefined as the percentage by which the producer price exceeds the border price. The estimates shown 
are the weighted averages for twelve commodities, using production valued at border prices as weights. 
The twelve commodities are rice, wheat, barley, corn, oats, rye, beef, pork, chicken, eggs, milk, and 
sugar. 
bWeighted average for all six countries shown for 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1987 but excluding Denmark 
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port c.i.f. or export f.0.b.) prices for selected years between  1955 and 1987. 
Producer prices are used because they include the effects not only of  border 
protection  but also of more direct agricultural  support policies such as defi- 
ciency payments. However,  the use of producer prices leads to an underesti- 
mation of  protection  to the extent that there are costs of marketing from the 
farm gate to a point in the marketing chain equivalent to the internationally 
traded product.  This bias is obvious in the case of  the food-exporting coun- 
tries such as Australia and the United States, for which the estimates of  nom- 
inal protection  rates are negative in some years  when in fact no policy was 
exercised  to exploit agriculture  or,  rather,  modest  protective  policies  were 
adopted. However,  insofar as this bias is similar across countries  and over 
time, it does not present a serious problem for the purpose of making broad 
comparisons. 
As seen in  table 4.2, average NRPs in recent years show a high level of 
agricultural protection in Japan. In 1987, the average NRP of Japan (151 per- 
cent) is much higher than the EC average (84 percent) and is lower than that 
in only Switzerland (218 percent) and Korea (160 percent).  The U.S. dollar 
was sharply depreciated in 1987, especially in comparison to 1985, when the 
dollar was still high relative to other currencies owing to the money supply 
control  of  the Reagan  administration, with  the effect of  lowering  domestic 
agricultural  prices  in  other countries relative to  the  import prices  in  dollar 
terms. Therefore, not only in Japan but also in most countries that apply in- 
sulation policies to prevent domestic agricultural markets from being tied to 
fluctuations  in world  prices, average NRPs rose  sharply between  1985 and 
1987. It is also noted that even the United States itself and other food export- 
ers raised their agricultural protection levels from 1985 to 1987, reflecting the 
increases in export subsidies and other government expenses for agricultural 
support programs in recent years. 
In  any case, there is no doubt that the level of  agricultural protection  in 
Japan, as measured by average NRP, is among the highest in the world. How- 
ever, the average  NRP of Japan in  1955 was  18 percent, only half  the EC 
average of  35 percent. It rose rapidly thereafter, reaching the EC level in 1960 
and the Swiss level  in  1965. This was  the period  when  Japan’s  economic 
growth was especially rapid. More dramatic were the cases of Korea and Tai- 
wan. Before the mid- 1960s, when their spurt of  industrial development be- 
gan, their average NRPs were negative, reflecting the practice of agricultural 
exploitation policies common to low-income countries. During the 1970s, the 
protection level rose sharply, and Korea caught up with Japan by 1980. 
4.2.2  Hypotheses on the Determinants of Agricultural Protection 
Underlying the growth in agricultural protection  is the change in equilib- 
rium of the political market. The political market for agricultural protection is 
stylized  in  the  framework of  the neoclassical  economic theory  of politics 
(Hayami 1988, app. A). In this framework, the demand and supply schedules 102  Masayoshi Honma 
of a policy that changes the level of agricultural protection are essentially the 
marginal evaluations of changes in political  support for politicians by those 
who  demand  and  those  who oppose, respectively,  agricultural  protection. 
Therefore, the level of protection is determined at a subjective equilibrium by 
politicians to maximize their net revenue in the form of political support. 
In a consideration of the factors that affect the demand and supply schedules 
of  agricultural protection policies, there are two important variables that act 
to shift each schedule. One is the comparative advantage of agriculture,  and 
the other is the share of agriculture in the total economy. 
The comparative advantage of agriculture is inversely related to the stage of 
a country’s industrial development and the need of reallocating resources from 
agriculture to industry. In the process of economic development based on in- 
dustrial growth, agriculture loses its comparative advantage, and the income 
position  of  farmers deteriorates, unless  resources  are reallocated  smoothly 
from agriculture  to  industry. Most of the resources  in agriculture,  however, 
are specialized and not easily transformed  for other uses. Thus, farmers de- 
mand  protection  so that they can  stay in farming despite the fact that their 
productivity  growth  lags behind  that  of  industry.  With  economic develop- 
ment, a declining  farming population  finds  it easier to organize and create 
political  pressure. Correspondingly,  the farmers’ marginal  political  support 
for politicians or the demand schedule of agricultural protection is shifted up- 
ward. 
The share of agriculture in the total economy indicates the degree of resist- 
ance to agricultural  protectionism.  As  the  importance of  agriculture  in  an 
economy declines in the course of economic development, resistance to agri- 
cultural protectionism  tends to decline. A relative contraction of  the agricul- 
tural sector in the total economy reduces the burden of agricultural protection 
per capita of the nonagricultural population. Consumers’ resistance to agricul- 
tural protection is reduced as their incomes rise and the Engel coefficient de- 
creases; hence, the effect of rising food prices on the cost of living diminishes. 
People become more tolerant of the high cost of agricultural protection as their 
nostalgia  for the pastoral  life increases, and their interest in environmental 
conservation  grows as the agricultural  sector  shrinks.  Correspondingly,  the 
marginal cost to politicians or the supply schedule of  agricultural protection 
declines. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that the level of agricultural protection is inversely 
associated with the comparative advantage of  agriculture and the share of ag- 
riculture  in the total economy. Not only the historical experiences of  Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan on NRPs but also the cross-sectional observations of NRPs 
in table 4.2  suggest the association of agricultural protection with comparative 
advantage.  These countries with large endowments of  agricultural  land per 
capita, like Australia, Canada, and the  United  States, show  low  levels  of 
NRPs, whereas  Switzerland, Japan, and Korea, which are characterized  by 
very meager endowments of natural resources for agricultural production rel- 
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the highest levels of NRPs in recent years. Even within the EC, the NRP is 
low for Denmark and the Netherlands,  which have traditionally been efficient 
agricultural producers, but high for Italy, which is known for its low agricul- 
tural  productivity.  At the  same time,  the  general  tendency  of  increases  in 
NRPs over time observed  in table 4.2 may  support the hypothesis  that  the 
level  of  agricultural  protection  is  associated  with  the  share of  agriculture, 
which has been contracting in most of the countries under study here. 
Another factor that obvious influences changes over time in the level of 
agricultural protection is the international terms of  trade between agricultural 
and industrial commodities. It is common for national governments in devel- 
oped countries to intervene in agricultural markets so as to stabilize domestic 
prices  at  the  expense of  instability  in  international  prices  (Johnson  1975), 
whereas industrial commodities are traded relatively freely with international 
price fluctuations pervading domestic markets. Therefore, the inverse corre- 
lation between the level of agricultural protection and the international terms 
of  trade, defined  as agricultural  export prices  divided  by  industrial  export 
prices in the world market, is expected. Indeed, the increase in NRP in most 
countries during the period between 1955 and 1970 corresponded to changes 
in the international terms of trade, which turned against agriculture under the 
pressure of accumulated surpluses of agricultural commodities in the United 
States  and other major exporters.  On the other hand, precipitous  drops  in 
NRPs were experienced from 1970 to 1975, corresponding to the sharp in- 
creases in world agricultural prices relative to industrial prices during the so- 
called world food crisis period. 
Other than  the  three  major factors outlined  above, I  also consider some 
country- or region-specific  factors that explain the variations in the level of 
agricultural protection in table 4.2. The first factor is that EC member coun- 
tries may have a different basis from other countries for agricultural protection 
because the EC acts as a regional bloc under the Common Agricultural Policy. 
The second is that Sweden and Switzerland have sought to be self-reliant and 
neutral  militarily  and  have  therefore  preferred  to  maintain  food  self- 
sufficiency as a part of  national security with a high level of agricultural pro- 
tection. The third is that Korea and Taiwan have taken a similar course in that 
their level of agricultural protection has grown as their economies have devel- 
oped. Finally, it is worthwhile to raise the question as to whether Japan’s ag- 
ricultural protection  level,  which is now among the highest in the world, is 
unique or can be explained by factors common to industrial countries. 
4.3  Regression Analysis of Agricultural Protection Level 
4.3.1  Specification 
In order to test the hypotheses in the previous section, a multiple-regression 
analysis is conducted. The dependent variable representing the level of  agri- 
cultural protection  in the regression is the average nominal protection coeffi- 104  Masayoshi Honma 
cient (NPC) for agriculture, which  is obtained by adding one (100 percent) 
to  NRP.  NPC,  the  ratio of  the  value  of  agricultural  output  in  domestic 
prices  to its value  in border prices,  is used  instead  of  NRP because  NPC 
is  consistent  with  the  explanatory variables  that  are defined  as  an  index 
setting  the  base  point  at  100, as explained  below.  Also,  the  logarithmic 
transformation  of  NPC represents  a  rate  of  difference  between  the  output 
valued in domestic and in border prices, and it is therefore easy to interpret 
the estimated coefficients in equations with variables transformed  into loga- 
rithms. 
The explanatory variables  are  three  fundamental  variables  representing 
(i) the comparative advantage of agriculture, (ii) the share of agriculture in the 
total economy, and (iii) the international terms of trade between  agriculture 
and  industrial  commodities  and  four  dummy  variables  representing  the 
country- or region-specific factors of (i) the EC (six EC countries), (ii) nona- 
ligned  Europe (Sweden and Switzerland), (iii) Asian  newly  industrializing 
economies (NIEs) (Korea and Taiwan), and (iv) Japan. 
As a variable to represent  the comparative advantage of  agriculture,  I use 
an index of  the productivity  ratio, which is the ratio of  labor productivity in 
agriculture to labor productivity  in industry. Intercountry cross-sectional data 
on labor productivity  in agriculture in real terms, as measured by total agri- 
cultural  output per  male  worker,  are  available  from  Hayami  and  Ruttan 
([1971] 1985) for 1980 and previous years. They are updated using agricul- 
tural production indexes (FAO, Production Yearbook) and data on male agri- 
cultural  labor (ILO, Yearbook of  Labor Statistics). As labor productivity in 
industry, average GDP per male worker for the whole economy at 1975 con- 
stant prices converted into U.S. dollars by purchasing-power-parity exchange 
rates in 1975 (OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries) is used because 
of  the lack of  comparable labor productivity data for the industrial sector. It 
seems reasonable to assume that labor productivity in the industrial sector and 
labor productivity  in  the total  economy are closely correlated  in industrial 
countries. The productivity ratio thus calculated is expressed as an index, with 
the U.S. value in 1975 set at 100. 
Two alternative variables are used to represent the relative share of agricul- 
ture in the total economy: agriculture’s share in the labor force and agricul- 
ture’s share in total GDP at 1975 constant prices. These data are obtained from 
ILO and OECD statistics. 
The international  terms of trade are specified as the ratio of the index of 
world export unit value of agricultural products (FAO, Trade Yearbook)  to the 
export  unit  value  index  of  manufactured  goods  from  market  economies 
(United Nations, Statistical Yearbook), with the 1975 value set equal 100. 
Detailed explanations of and data for the variables listed above are given in 
Honma and Hayami (1986,  1991). The variables  other than  dummies are 
transformed  into logarithms, and the regression equation is specified as fol- 
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In  P  = b, + b, In C  + b, In S  + 6, (In S)z  (1)  + b, In  T + b,E  + b,N  + b,A  + b,J  + e, 
where P  is the nominal protection coefficient,  C is the index of comparative 
advantage in agriculture, S is the share of agriculture in the total economy, T 
is the international terms of trade, and E, N,  A,  and J are dummies represent- 
ing the EC, nonmilitarily aligned countries,  Asian NIEs,  and Japan, respec- 
tively, taking a value of 1 if the observation is for the region or country and 0 
otherwise.  Specifically, the EC dummy is designed to be 1 from 1965 for the 
original  EC member  countries,  1  from  1975 for  Denmark  and  the  United 
Kingdom, and 0 otherwise to capture the effect of the Common Market cor- 
rectly. The notation In refers to natural logarithms, and e is the error term. The 
square of In S is included to test for the possibility that the level of agricultural 
protection does not increase monotonically as the agricultural sector shrinks; 
the political influence of the farm sector may begin to decline beyond a certain 
threshold. 
The model specified in the form of equation (1) is estimated by the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method. Data for the dependent variable are available for 
fourteen countries at eight points in time for the period 1955-87,  as observed 
in table 4.2. Thus, the regression analysis is conducted with 112 observations 
pooling fourteen countries at eight points in time between  1955 and  1987. It 
must be cautioned that some of the explanatory variables used in this analysis 
are not independent of the level of protection. For example, increased protec- 
tion may exacerbate inefficiency in agricultural production and possibly block 
improvements in agriculture’s  comparative  advantage.  Likewise,  protection 
increases inhibit the decline in the share of  agriculture in the total economy. 
Considering  the  possibility  of  bias due to such simultaneity,  the estimated 
regression parameters must be interpreted with caution. 
4.3.2  Results of Estimation 
The results of estimating regression equations are summarized in table 4.3. 
Regressions (1) and (2) represent the model, which includes only fundamental 
variables  as explanatory  variables; dummies are included in regressions (3) 
and (4). All the coefficients of  fundamental variables satisfy the sign condi- 
tions postulated  and are highly significant statistically. It is noteworthy that 
about 70 percent of the variations in NPC among countries and over time are 
explained  in regressions  (1) and (2) by only three fundamental variables- 
comparative  advantage,  share  of  agriculture,  and  international  terms 
of  trade-as  the  coefficients  of  determination  adjusted  for  the  degrees 
of  freedom  indicated.  The results  support  my  hypothesis  that  the  level of 
agricultural protection  rises as the comparative  advantage shifts away from 
agriculture and  as the  international  terms of trade turn  against agricultural 
commodities. 
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Table 4.3  Estimates of Regressions to Explain Nominal Agricultural Protection 
Coefficients in Fourteen Industrial Countries for 1955-87 
Regression 





Share of agriculture: 
In labor force (A) 
(In S,) 
In GDP (B)  (In S,) 
Square of A (In S,)* 
Square of B (In SJ2 




Asian NIEs (A) 
Intercept 
Adjusted coefficient of 
determination (RZ) 
Standard error of estimate 
Threshold value of Sa 




-  .117** 
(-5.65) 










-  .125** 
(-5.10) 










-  .098** 
(-3.82) 
-  .951** 





~  .029 
(- .34) 


























Note: Student  t-values are in parentheses,  with  levels of  statistical  significance shown as ** 
(1 percent) and * (5 percent). Equations with variables transformed into logarithms are estimated 
by the ordinary least squares method. 
aThe  threshold value in the share of  agriculture was obtained by solving b, + 26, In  S  = 0. 
positive  and negative,  respectively,  in any case. This means that  NPC is a 
concave function of  agriculture’s share and, therefore, that there is a specific 
point in agriculture’s share that maximizes the level of agricultural protection 
with other things held constant. Thus, NPC continues to increase at a dimin- 
ishing rate until the share of  agriculture declines to a certain point, beyond 
which NPC decreases at a rate corresponding to further decreases in agricul- 
ture’s share. This threshold point in agriculture’s share is calculated by solving 
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a In  Pi3 In S  = b, + 2b, In S  = 0. 
The calculated threshold value for each equation is shown in the last row of 
table 4.3. The threshold is reached when agriculture’s share in the male labor 
force is 4-5  percent or when its share in GDP is 3-4  percent.  These levels 
have already been reached in most European countries and those countries that 
are major food exporters, while Korea and Taiwan are still approaching the 
threshold.  Japan, whose agricultural  share is 5.7  percent  in the male  labor 
force or 2.3  percent in real GDP in 1987, is just passing the threshold. In other 
words, the farm bloc in Japan is at the height of its political  strength today, 
having reached the optimal size for effective lobbying. This may partly  ex- 
plain why neither the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) nor any opposi- 
tion party could say anything in favor of agricultural trade liberalization dur- 
ing the recent  general elections  for fear of losing farm votes.  At the same 
time, the results outlined above suggest that the political  strength of farmers 
in Japan may weaken gradually if Japan’s agricultural share declines further. 
However, the share of  agriculture, especially in the labor force, is unlikely to 
decline significantly in the short run because of the generally slow movement 
of labor out of agriculture. Moreover, the high level of agricultural protection 
itself plays a role in keeping agriculture’s share from declining. Such resist- 
ance of agriculture’s share to a further decline, combined with a high level of 
protection, results in a stalemate of domestic agricultural policies not only in 
Japan but also in other developed countries. Agricultural issues were brought 
onto the stage of international politics at, for example, summit meetings and 
the GATT multilateral negotiations as a way out of this stalemate was sought. 
Another implication of the threshold values in table 4.3 is that agricultural 
protection may  well increase further in newly  industrializing countries such 
as Korea and Taiwan as their agricultural sectors continue to decline toward 
the present  levels  of  Western  Europe  and Japan.  This experience of Asian 
NIEs may be repeated in other newly industrializing areas such as ASEAN 
countries. Therefore, international collaborative efforts to prevent the spread 
of agricultural protection need to be intensified. 
The coefficients of  dummy variables  in regressions (3) and (4) show the 
effects of  country-  or region-specific  factors.  The coefficients  of  the  EC 
dummy are positive and statistically significant in both regression (3) and re- 
gression (4) at a conventional level. This supports the hypothesis that the EC 
acts as a regional bloc to provide more protection for agricultural producers in 
member countries than they would have without the Common Market.  The 
coefficients of the nonalliance dummy are also positive and statistically signif- 
icant, with a greater value than the EC dummy. Therefore, the hypothesis that 
the Swedes and the  Swiss, who  wish  to remain nonaligned,  are willing  to 
shoulder the high cost of agricultural protection in order to increase their level 
of food self-sufficiency for reasons of national security is strongly supported. 
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the Japan dummy and the Asian NIEs dummy are not significantly different 
from zero, even  at a very  low level of statistical significance.  Such results 
imply that the agricultural protection level of Japan and Asian NIEs may be 
neither exceptional nor unique in view of determinants of agricultural protec- 
tion postulated in this study. The high rates of agricultural protection growth 
in Japan and two other East Asian countries may be the results, not of factors 
specific to the region, such as extreme agricultural fundamentalism,  but of 
factors common to all industrial countries,  such as the high social costs of 
intersectoral adjustment arising from the decline in agriculture’s comparative 
advantage and the decrease in the nonagricultural population’s resistance to 
agricultural protection in the process of industrial development. 
4.4  Accounting for Agricultural Protection Growth 
In order to identify the contributions of the three fundamental variables to 
Japan’s growth in agricultural protection for the period  1955-87,  the growth 
rate of NPC is decomposed by using the following growth-accounting equa- 
tion derived from equation (1): 
(2)  (P/P) = b,(C/C) + (b, + 2b, In)  (s/S) + b4(T/T) + U, 
where (ill‘),  (ClC),  (k/S),  and (?/Q are the annual compound rate of growth 
in NPC, the index of agricultural comparative advantage, the share of agricul- 
ture, and the international terms of trade, respectively; the b’s are the regres- 
sion coefficients estimated;  is the mean of In S; and U is the unexplained 
residual. Each item on the right-hand side of equation (2) represents the con- 
tribution of each factor to the growth of NPC. 
The results of the growth-accounting analysis for Japan based on the esti- 
mated coefficients of regressions  (1) and (2) in table 4.3 are summarized in 
table 4.4. Japan’s NPC rose at the rate of 2.4 percent per year on average for 
the period  1955-87.  Roughly speaking, about half this growth of Japan’s ag- 
ricultural  protection  is explained  by  changes  in  the  international  terms  of 
trade, about one-third by decreases in agriculture’s share, and about one-sixth 
by declines in the agricultural comparative advantage, while the negative con- 
tribution of an unexplained residual of about 10 percent is recorded. 
However, if the period under consideration is divided into two subperiods, 
1955-75  and 1975-87,  the following differences between the two periods can 
be  seen. In the  period  1955-75,  which includes the era of rapid economic 
growth in Japan, the contributions of comparative advantage and agricultural 
share were much larger than in the second period,  1975-87.  About 80 percent 
of the growth in agricultural protection for the first period is explained by the 
factors of comparative advantage and agricultural share, which are related to 
the costs of intersectoral adjustment and the changes in the political  strength 
of the agricultural sector in the course of industrial growth. Table 4.4  Accounting for Agricultural Protection Growth in Japan 
Year and Regression Used 
1955-87  1955-75  1975-87 
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Growth in NPC (% per year)’  2.39  2.39  2.02  2.02  3.00  3.00 
(100)  (loo)  (100)  (100)  (100) 
Contribution due to:b 
Comparative advantage  .40  .35  .46  .40  .30  .26 
(17)  (15)  (23)  (20)  (10)  (9) 
(40)  (31)  (67)  (59)  (10)  (- 1) 
(54)  (62)  (20)  (23)  (92)  (104) 
(-11)  (-8)  (-10)  (-2)  (- 12)  (- 12) 
Agriculture’s share  .97  .73  1.36  1.20  .31  -  .04 
Terms of trade  1.29  1.47  .41  .46  2.75  3.13 
Unexplained residual  -.27  -.17  -.20  -.05  -  .35  .35 
‘Numbers in parentheses represent the sum of contributions in percentages 
bContribution is calculated on the basis of  eq. (2) using the estimated coefficients in table 4.3 and the per annum growth rate of 
the related variable for each period. The percentage of the total growth of NPC due to each factor is shown in parentheses. 110  Masayoshi Honma 
On the other hand, the growth in agricultural protection  in the second pe- 
riod is explained  mostly by  the  international terms of  trade.  This seems to 
imply that there was no longer strong pressure for further agricultural protec- 
tion  attributed  to  rapid  industrial  growth, which  ended  in  the  mid-1970s. 
However, the farmers were still politically strong enough to maintain the pro- 
tective  measures established  in the previous  period.  With border protection 
measures that block the penetration of price fluctuations in the world market 
into the domestic market, the protection level rises automatically owing to this 
insulation of the domestic market from outside competition,  when the inter- 
national  terms of  trade  turn  against agricultural products,  especially in the 
1980s. Such irreversibility of agricultural policy has been a growing source of 
trade friction between Japan and the food-exporting countries. The large con- 
tribution  of  the  terms of  trade  to the  growth  in  agricultural protection  for 
1975-87  resulted from the gap between domestic and international prices that 
widened  as  the  world  food  market  became  increasingly  depressed  in  the 
1980s. As a result, external pressure on Japan to liberalize agricultural trade 
has increased in recent years. Concomitantly,  such external pressure has be- 
come a more dominant player in the political  market for agricultural protec- 
tion  in  Japan,  while  domestic  consumers  have  been  tolerant  of  protection 
growth. 
4.5  Conclusion 
A source of agricultural protectionism in an industrializing economy is the 
difficulty of  reallocating  resources,  especially labor, from the agriculture to 
the nonagricultural sector in the face of  relative declines in demand for food 
as per capita income increases. As an economy reaches an advanced stage of 
development, the political environment favors the agricultural sector for pro- 
tection  because  the relative contraction of agriculture in the total  economy 
reduces consumers’ resistance to agricultural protection, on the one hand, and 
makes political  lobbying by farmers more efficient, on the other. Thus, agri- 
cultural protectionism tends to be accepted in the process of economic devel- 
opment, and protectionist policies for agriculture are commonly observed in 
most industrial countries. 
I examined the growth of agricultural protection  in Japan in this political 
market  framework.  Japan’s level of  agricultural protection  was much  lower 
than the European  level in  1955, when Japan’s economy was still relatively 
undeveloped. But protection increased rapidly thereafter in the course of  Ja- 
pan’s rapid industrial growth in order to ease the problem of a widening urban- 
rural income disparity, which was caused by the difficulty of reallocating  re- 
sources.  A  multiple  regression  analysis  using  observations  from  fourteen 
countries at eight points in time from 1955 to 1987 found that the growth in 
agricultural  protection  in  Japan  was  not  based  on  a  unique  bias  toward 
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in agriculture’s comparative advantage, the contraction of agriculture’s  share 
in the total economy, and the worsening  international  terms of trade,  all of 
which are factors common to all industrial countries  as determinants of  the 
agricultural protection level. 
However, the way in which the level of  agricultural protection is raised has 
been changed. Japan’s growth in agricultural protection by  1975 was attrib- 
uted mostly to changes in the comparative advantage and the share of agricul- 
ture that  were  related  to the rapid industrial  growth. But  its growth in the 
1980s was explained mainly by changes in the international terms of  trade. 
This implies  that, even  when  the intersectoral  adjustment  problem  became 
less serious after the Japanese economy entered a slower growth era, the farm 
bloc remained strong enough politically to maintain the established protection 
measures, with the result that the protection level continued to rise in response 
to declines in the world market prices of  agricultural products. 
It is time for Japan’s policymakers to consider efficient ways of  real inter- 
sectoral adjustments  along with substantial decreases in the agricultural pro- 
tection  level,  in  order to  avoid progressive  decay  under  increasing  foreign 
pressure and to harmonize agricultural policies internationally while seeking 
economic prosperity based on freer trade with international cooperation. 
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Comment  Joachim Zietz 
Masayoshi Honma’s paper is a commendable effort at testing, for the case of 
agriculture, two implications of  Downs’s (I  957) model of the political market 
for protection:  (i) as comparative advantage declines for agriculture,  the de- 
mand for protection  rises;  (ii) as the agricultural  sector shrinks in size, the 
supply of  protection rises. 
At least two important results emerge, one methodological  and one sub- 
stantive.  As for methodology,  the  paper’s  results  lend  support to Downs’s 
model  of  the political  market for protection.  This is comforting since this 
model is a popular point of departure in studies of agricultural protection. The 
substantive contribution  of the paper is to relate the size of the agricultural 
sector to  average protection  in agriculture. It is suggested  that  agricultural 
protection reaches a maximum when agriculture reaches about 3-4  percent of 
GDP. The latter result  suggests some interesting  applications for predicting 
future levels of agricultural protection. 
Some of the paper’s technical details require some comments. The average 
rates of  nominal  protection  calculated  for grains  and livestock in table 4.2 
have to be interpreted with some care. They are weighted averages, with the 
weights representing the adjustment of markets to the change in relative prices 
caused by protection.  Since both the intensity of the adjustment response and 
the length of the adjustment period may be quite different among various com- 
modities, weighted averages may lead to some peculiar results, for example, 
to  relatively  low average nominal  rates of protection  for livestock in Japan. 
Unweighted averages may avoid some of these problems,  although they can 
also introduce others. 
The regression model is subject to some caveats. 
1. The choice of the dependent variable in the model, the nominal rate of 
protection (NRP), raises some interesting questions. First, does the NRP ade- 
quately  capture the protective  effort of the government? The answer to this 
question can only be a qualified yes. Border  measures are surely captured, 
regardless of  whether they come in the form of  tariff or nontariff barriers to 
trade. This does not apply, however, to other government interventions, such 
as government support measures (e.g., explicit or implicit  input subsidies) 
that work on the input side. The measure known as producer subsidy equiva- 
lent (PSE) combines these subsidies with the NRP and, therefore,  is a more 
complete measure of government support. But even PSEs do not capture the 
protection  afforded  to value added. Hence, effective rates of protection that 
model the true production incentive effect more closely can still be underesti- 
mated  for certain products. The relatively  low NRP for beef  in Japan,  for 
example, hides a very high effective rate of protection that is induced by the 
low tariff on feed grain imports. 
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Second, the NRP may  not  be tied  very closely  to the variables that  are 
targeted by agricultural policymakers and the farming lobby. For example, the 
NRP for a particular commodity can change dramatically from year to year 
without a change in government policy because of  changes in world price. A 
similar problem arises from the need to convert all prices into a common cur- 
rency, mostly the U.S. dollars. The recent changes in the value of the dollar 
cause fluctuations in the NRP that cannot be attributed to changes in govern- 
ment policy. In sum, the use of the NRP may induce a significant amount of 
noise in the regression equation, that is, variation that cannot be attributed to 
government policy. If the latter is what is the focus of the research, the NRP 
may not be an ideal candidate for the dependent variable. 
2. In an apparent effort to reduce the noise introduced into the NRP measure 
by world  price fluctuations,  Honma introduces into the regression  equation 
the international  terms of trade between  agriculture and industry. One won- 
ders to what extent this variable is exogenous. There may be a good case for 
believing that  it is endogenous, especially  in a regression  that  explains  the 
NRP of  the majority  of industrialized  countries. Agricultural  protection  by 
industrialized  countries is well  known to depress world  prices quite signifi- 
cantly and, hence, to deteriorate the terms of trade for agricultural exporters. 
If this is the case, however, the agricultural terms of trade make little sense as 
an explanatory factor.  Being  the consequence of  high  NRPs, they  cannot 
serve, at the same time, as an explanation of  high NRPs. 
3. The evidence on the dummy variables is used to conclude that Japanese 
protection  is not  fundamentally  different  from that  of  other industrialized 
countries. This conclusion holds for the set of dummy variables presented. 
However, those dummy variables assume a standard fixed-effects model: they 
modify the intercept term for various classes of observations. This is not the 
only model one can think of. Dummy variables may be used with equal justi- 
fication to modify any of  the slope parameters. In a general interaction term 
model, Japan may  turn out to be fundamentally  different after all, for ex- 
ample, with regard to its response to a decline in comparative advantage. 
4. A number of measures, such as productivity, are defined with respect to 
the male labor force. This may introduce some unwanted noise into the re- 
gression for countries that have experienced a strong increase in female labor 
force participation over the sample period, such as the United States. A more 
general definition of  the labor force would probably be preferable. 
5. The unexplained  part in table 4.4 suggests an overestimate of  NRPs for 
the period  1955-70  and an underestimate  for 1970-87.  In a straight time- 
series analysis, this would be indicative of positive autocorrelation. How can 
that be explained in this context? Has there been a structural change over time 
in the behavior of governments, or is it an indication of a problem with statis- 
tical  model  adequacy? The reader may be more convinced  of  the merits of 
the model if some statistical adequacy tests were performed. For example, a 
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but also to see whether the nonlinearity in the size of agriculture is the only 
one in the model. 
Overall, the model provided by Honma provides a good starting point for 
investigating  some additional questions regarding  the political economy  of 
agricultural protection. One interesting next step could be to disaggregate the 
model further. One may ask, for example, why ruminant meat and dairy is so 
much  more protected  than  nonruminant meat in most countries. Does this 
pattern develop over the course of a country’s development, or does it hold at 
any stage of  development? Similar questions can be posed about the differ- 
ences in the pattern and degree of  protection provided to staple food products 
versus nontraditional agricultural products, such as fruit and vegetables. 
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